The Impostor and the Law by Editors,
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
ernmental agencies, particularly the Home Owners' Loan Corporation and the
Federal Housing Administration, engaged in an interstate business of mortgage
lending. For the extension of credit on most favorable terms and for the efficient
operation of these agencies, uniformity is necessary. Finally, these federal
agencies are behind the new act and are intent on securing its widespread adop-




The Impostor and the Law
A type of fraud common to many fields of the law is that of fraud by imper-
sonation. In whatever field it may occur, the important consideration is found in
the intention of the party dealing with the impostor. This provides the basis for
determining whether the impostor has obtained title to goods or to a negotiable
instrument, whether he is guilty of a particular crime, or whether a valid contract
has been formed. The fundamental rule with regard to intention is well illustrated
by the law with respect to criminal assault in which the defense of mistaken
identity often is pleaded. It is settled law that one may properly be convicted of
assault with intent to kill the victim even though the evidence may show that the
defendant mistook him for another whom, in fact, he had desired to slay.' The
defendant intended to kill the man physically before him who, in reality, was the
victim, and it is no defense that he might not have so intended had he been aware
of the true identity of the latter. It is this theory of intention that will be found
to dominate the impostor cases and hereinafter will be designated as the physical
presence doctrine.
Criminal Law
The mental state of the victim often is relevant in determining the guilt or
innocence of the defendant. Frequently, this becomes an issue in cases of alleged
rape in discovering whether a victim has consented to the impostor's act and arises
in larceny in determining whether title has passed to the impostor. Thus, in
State v. Brooks,' where the defendant had carnal knowledge of a woman by falsely
impersonating her husband, he was held not guilty of rape on the ground that
she consented to intercourse with the man before her who, in fact, was the defend-
ant, and, therefore, her consent constituted a valid defense.8 However, a con-
trary theory is found in Regina v. Dee.4 In holding the defendant guilty, the
court said: ". . . In the cases of idiocy, of stupor, or of infancy, it is held that
there is no legal consent, from the want of an intelligent and discerning will.
Can a woman, in the case of personation, be regarded as consenting to the act in
the exercise of an intelligent will? Does she consent, not knowing the real nature
of the act? . . . she intends to consent to a lawful and marital act, to which it
is her duty to submit. But did she consent to an act of adultery?" 5 Although
I. Isham v. State, 38 Ala. 213 (1862) ; People v. Wells, 145 Cal. 138, 78 Pac. 470
(19o4) ; State v. Costa, 95 Conn. 14o, Iio Atl. 875 (1920) ; CLARK AND MARSHALL, CRIMES
(3d ed. 1927) § 43 (b) and notes thereto. Contra: Rex v. Holt, 7 C. & P. 518 (1836). See
also Levitt, Extent and F nnction of the Doctrine of Mens Rea (1923) 17 ILL. L. REv. 578.
2. 76 N. C. I (877).
3. Accord: Wyatt v. State, 2 Swan. 394 (Tenn. 1854) ; Regina v. Barrow, L. R. I C. C.
R. 155 (1868).
4. L. R. 14 Ir. 468 (1884).
5. Id. at 479.
NOTES
technically incorrect, a socially desirable result is thus obtained. 6 Rather than
upset a logical and convenient theory in order to hold the defendant guilty in the
particular instance, it would seem that the matter could better be settled by
statute. England and several of our states recognizing this, have solved the
problem in this manner.
7
The doctrine of physical presence appears also in the larceny cases. In Rex
v. Story,8 defendant was held not guilty of larceny where he presented a money
order to another and received payment thereon on the false representation that
he was the named payee. There is no larceny as the victim intends to pass title to
the man before him and thus the latter, if anything, is guilty of false pretenses.9
Non-Negotiable Contracts and Sales
In considering the application of the physical presence doctrine in these fields,
and later in negotiable instruments, it will be helpful to keep in mind three sets
of circumstances: (i) where the impostor deals in person with the other party,
(2) where he carries on his dealings by correspondence, and (3) where either in
person or by correspondence, he falsely represents himself to be the agent of some
third person.
(i) In the case of non-negotiable contracts, where one person, by misrepre-
senting his identity, induces another, in his presence, to enter into negotiations
with him, a valid contract is created.'0 The impostor, of course, intends to con-
tract with the other party, while the latter intends to contract with the man before
him, that is, the impostor. Thus, both parties possess the mental state requisite
to the formation of the contract. For example, where one by impersonation pro-
cures an insurance policy in another's name, which policy contains an incontestable
clause, the estate of the impostor may recover on the policy after the stated time
within which it may be contested has passed. Intending to contract with the
man before him, the agent for the insurance company has entered into a contract
with the impostor." However, the party impersonated could not recover on the
policy since the insurance company never intended to contract with him.
In these cases, while there is a contract in existence, it is voidable between
the parties because of the fraud,' and also against subsequent assignees of the
impostor.13  In general, such an assignee takes the contract subject to all the
6. In accord with Regina v. Dee, L. R. 14 In 468 (1884), cited supra note 4, see State v.
Shepard, 7 Conn. 54 (1828).
7. CRIMIlNAL LAW -,AMENDMENT ACT, 1885, 48 & 49 VIcT. c. 69, § 4 reads as follows:
"Whereas doubts have been entertained whether a man who induces a married woman to
permit him to have connexion with her by personating her husband is or is not guilty of
rape, it is hereby enacted and declared that every such offender shall be deemed to be guilty
of rape." See also State v. Williams, 128 N. C. 573, 37 S. E. 952 (19O2) ; Draughn v. State,
12 Old. Cr. 479, 158 Pac. 890 (1916) ; Mooney v. State, 29 Tex. Cr. App. 257, 15 S. W. 724
(i8go).
8. Russ. & R. 81 (1805).
9. See also Hudspeth v. Commonwealth, 195 Ky. 4, 241 S. W. 71 (1922) ; Rex v. Adams,
Russ. & R. 225 (1812) ; CLARK AND MARSHAIL, Op. cit. supra note I, § 318 (a), n. 130.
io. Gotthelf v. Shapiro, 136 App. Div. 2, 12o N. Y. Supp. 210 (2d Dep't, 19o9) ; see
Ludwinska v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 317 Pa. 577, 581, 178 At. 28, 30 (1935) ; I
WLLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) § 20; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (932) § 475; Ash-
ley, Mutual Consent in Contract (903) 3 COL. Li REV. 71.
ii. See Ludwinska v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 317 Pa. 577, 581, 178 Atl. 28, 30
(1935) ; RESTATEMENT, CoNTRACTs (1932) § 475, illus. 5. See also Gotthelf v. Shapiro, 136
App. Div. I, 12o N. Y. Supp. 21o (2d Dep't, 29o9).
12. Fay v. Hill, 249 Fed. 4,5 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918), 28 YALE L. J. 4,5 (929) ; RESTATE-
MENT, CONTRACTS (1932) §§ 475, 476; RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION (1937) § 28; 5 WILuIs-
TON, CONTRACTS § 1517.
13. Boatsmen's Bank v. Fretzlen, 175 Fed. 183 (C. C. D. Kan. i9og) ; Morgan Munitions
Supply Co. v. Studebaker Corp., 226 N. Y. 94, 123 N. E. 146 (1919) ; RESTATEMENT, CON-
TRACTS (932) § 167.
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defenses which the obligor may have had against the assignor. Exceptions have
been made in cases of marriage contracts where the impostor, by false representa-
tions of his identity and social position, induces another to become his wife.
Because of the policy of upholding marital relations, regardless of how obtained,
most courts have held these contracts not to be voidable.14  However, perhaps
because of a more liberal concept of marriage, a few courts have permitted avoid-
ance where the social consequences become serious.
1 5
The impostor situation becomes increasingly important in the law of sales.
The determination of whether or not the impostor has acquired a voidable title
is controlling in deciding whether or not a subsequent purchaser in good faith
obtains a right to the goods superior to that of the person defrauded. If the
impostor obtained a voidable title, it becomes unimpaired in the hands of a bona
fide purchaser,' but if the impostor had no property whatsoever in the goods,
the owner, of course, may recover them from the transferee.
Where the impostor is dealing face to face with the seller, title to the goods,
though a voidable one, is held to pass under the physical presence doctrine. The
leading American decision is an early Massachusetts case, Edmunds v. Merchants
Dispatch Transportation Co.,'7 where the impostor, falsely representing that he
was a certain reputable merchant, obtained goods on credit. In an action against
the carrier for wrongful delivery of the goods, the court, in holding that title to
the goods passed to the impostor and that there had been no unauthorized deliv-
ery, stated: "The seller . . . could not have supposed he was selling to any
other person (than the impostor) ; his intention was to sell to the person present,
and identified by sight and hearing .... " 8 This view represents the over-
whelming weight of authority, 9 and manifestly is desirable inasmuch as the seller,
who by his credulity has made the fraud possible, bears the loss rather than an
innocent transferee. 20  However, some courts have held that the impostor will
not acquire title where he has given a forged check for the goods; hence, a sub-
sequent transferee, though purchasing for value and for good faith, is not pro-
tected.21 The theory of this minority is that because of public policy the impostor
may not transfer his title which he acquired by means of the crime of larceny 
22
or forgery. Although a salutary result is obtained, the logic of the minority is
questionable.
Another form of impersonation, not heretofore mentioned, is where the
impostor carries on his negotiations by telephone. While there is no direct
14. Marshall v. Marshall, 212 Cal. 736, 300 Pac. 816 (931). See also 4 WILLIsTr,
CoNTRAcTs § 1031.
15. Brown v. Scott, 140 Md. 258, u7 Atl. 114 (1922), 22 COL. L. REV. 662; 4 WIL.IsToN,
CONTRACTS § i031. See Brown, Duress and Fraud as Grounds for the Annulment of Mar-
riage (1935) 1o IND. L. J. 471; Note 0925) 73 U. OF PA. L. RV. I95.
16. White v. Dodge, 187 Mass. 449, 73 N. E. 549 (i9o5) ; Phelps v. McQuade, 220 N. Y.
232, 115 N. E. 441 (1917). See Lightman v. Boyd, 132 Ala. 618, 61g, 32 So. 714, 7,5 (902).
17. 135 Mass. 283 (1883).
I8. Id. at 283.
ig. Phelps v. McQuade, 22o N. Y. 232, 115 N. E. 441 (917) ; Phillips v. Brooks, [1919]
2 K. B. 243; 2 WILLISTON, SALEs (2d ed. 1924) § 635; MAR.AsH, SL.ES (930) § 363; Umr-
FoRm SaEs AcT § 24, I U. L. A. 193. See also ANsoN, CONTRACTS (1929) § 2M2, n. 6.
Contra: Windle v. Citizens Nat. Bank, 204 Mo. App. 6o6, 26 S. W. 1023 (1920), 4 MINN.
L. RE V. 460.
20. Hickey v. McDonald, 151 Ala. 497, 44 So. 201 (1907) ; Martin v. Green, 117 Me.
138, IO2 Atl. 977 (I918).
21. Gustafson v. Equitable Loan Ass'n, 186 Minn. 236, 253 N. W. io6 (1932) ; Amols v.
Bernstein, 214 App. Div. 469, 212 N. Y. Supp. 518 (Ist Dep't, 1926), 74 U. OF PA. L. REv.
749, 26 CoL L. REv. 636, 11 CoRN. L. Q. 422, 39 HAgv. L. REv. 9o4. Cf. Linn v. Reid, 114
Wash. 6o9, z96 Pac. 13 (1921).
22. These courts are wrong in assuming larceny has been committed. Inasmuch as the
dealings are face to face, the party defrauded intends to pass title and, therefore, the im-
postor is not guilty of larceny.
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decision on this point, it would seem that title to goods obtained in this manner
should pass.23  In Tideman & Co. v. McDonald,24 the defendant accepted the
plaintiff's offer over the telephone, thinking that plaintiff was another person.
The court held that this mistake in identity did not prevent the existence of a
contract. It would appear that the intention of the offeree was to contract with
the person with whom he was speaking. Furthermore, this would seem to be the
suggestion of section 65 of the Restatement of Contracts: "Acceptance by tele-
phone is governed by the principles applicable to oral acceptances where the
parties are in the presence of each other." 25 Applying this then to a case where
an impostor uses the telephone, it would follow that the impostor would get a
voidable title which would protect subsequent innocent purchasers. Since the
seller has chosen to rely on his sense of hearing in identifying the impostor, it is
more equitable that he bear the loss rather than the innocent purchasers.
(2) The problem next arises in the case of an impostor, who, negotiating by
letter, induces another to enter into an agreement with him by falsely representing
himself to be an acquaintance of the defrauded party. The question as to the
existence of a contract becomes important only where the defrauded party seeks
to enforce the agreement, for as against the impostor or a subsequent assignee, it
may be avoided. In this situation, however, it is generally held that no contract
exists at all.26 The intention of the party receiving the letter is to enter into an
agreement with the person whose name is signed thereon. He does not contem-
plate any dealings with the impostor in view of his ignorance of the existence of
the latter. There is, of course, no binding agreement between the defrauded party
and the person whose name appeared on the letter inasmuch as the latter never
assented to any contract.
Similarly, in the case of a sale, where the negotiations are by correspondence,
the impostor gets no title.27 The leading case is Cundy v. Lindsay,
2s in which the
impostor, through a written order, obtained goods from the plaintiff and, in turn,
sold them to defendants who were innocent purchasers. Defendants transferred
the goods to other innocent parties. In an action for conversion, it was held that
the plaintiffs could recover. Although the impostor had obtained possession of
the goods, he had never acquired any title which he could transfer to defendants.
Therefore, a sale by them constituted a conversion. As stated by the court in
Phelps v. McQuade,29 in which the Cundy case was discussed, ". . . the vendor
intends to deal with the person whose name is signed to the letter. He knows no
one else. He supposes he is dealing with no one else." Thus, it is clear that the
impostor obtains no title to the goods.
However, where the impostor in ordering goods, signs a purely fictitious
name to a letter, it has been held that title will pass.
80 The seller, having no
23. See Selma Savings Bank v. Webster County Bank, 182 Ky. 604, 6og, 206 S. W. 870,
872 (igi8) ; Fox River Butter Co. v. Lightning Motor Line, 125 Misc. i6, 122, 21o N. Y.
Supp. 172, 177 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
24. 275 S. W. 70 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926), 39 HARv. L. REv. 388, 4 TEx. L. REv. 252.
25. See 5 WILUST01T, CONTRACS § 1517, n. I.
26. See Cundy v. Lindsay, 3 A. C. 459 (1878) ; ANsON, CONTRACTS (I929) § 212; RE-
STATEMENT, CoNmACrs (1932) § 475.
27. School Sisters of Notre Dame v. Kusnitt, 125 Md. 323, 93 Atl. 928 (1915) ; Brighton
Packing Co. v. Butcher's Slaughtering and Melting Ass'n, 211 Mass. 398, 97 N. E. 780
(1912) ; Phelps v. McQuade, 22o N. Y. 232, 15 N. E. 441 (917) ; Newberry v. Norfolk &
S. R. It, 133 N. C. 45, 45 S. E. 356 (1903) ; Cundy v. Lindsay, 3 A. C. 459 (1878) ; see
Bond Trouser Co. v. American Ry. Exp. Co., 124 Misc. 61g, 620, 208 N. Y. Supp. 643, 645
(N. Y. City Ct. 1925) ; ANsoN, CONTRACTS (1929) § 212; 5 Wn.LisToN, CONTRACTS § 1517;
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 475.
28. 3 A. C. 459 (1878).
29. 22o N. Y. 232, 235, 115 N. E. 441, 442 (1917).
30. Alexander v. Swackhamer, 1o5 Ind. 8i, 4 N. E. 433 (885) ; King's Norton Metal
Co. v. Elridge, Merrett & Co., I4 T. L. R. 98 (C. A. 1897), 5 WILLISTOx, CONTRACTS § 1517.
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acquaintance with an individual of that name, intends to deal with the person
represented by the signature. The impostor, having adopted that name for this
transaction, acquires title.
(3) Where, either in person or by correspondence, the impostor falsely rep-
resents that he is acting as the agent of some third person and thus purports to
enter into a contract on behalf of an alleged principal, the agreement is a nullity
inasmuch as the innocent party has only consented to dealings with the alleged
principal and the latter has never agreed to the transaction.,' In like manner,
where the impostor gets possession of goods under a similar pretense, title to the
goods does not pass.32
Negotiable Instruments
In the field of negotiable instruments, the desire of the courts to foster the
negotiability of the instrument will be found to underlie the holdings in the imper-
sonation cases departing from rules applicable in other branches of the law.
(i) Where the impostor is physically present, the maker is conclusively pre-
sumed to have intended to make the instrument payable to the person before him.
A subsequent endorsement by the impostor, therefore, is not a forgery and passes
good title to the instrument, protecting subsequent bona fide purchasers.
83
Inasmuch as the same rule is applied in other branches of the law and in view of
the added incentive to foster negotiability, this is evidently the only proper result.
(2) Where, however, the dealings are by correspondence, in contrast to the
rule adopted in the law of sales and contracts, the tendency is to hold that title
passes and that a holder in due course from the impostor may recover on the
instrument. 4 The courts, for the purpose of furthering negotiability, readily find
that the intention of the maker is to make the instrument payable to the one who
wrote the letter. Since the defrauded party is more at fault than the innocent
transferee, this is a preferable result and one which might well be adopted in the
sales cases.
(3) However, where the wrongdoer represents himself to be the agent of a
purported principal, either fictitious or real, the decision cannot be the same.
Under no stretch of the imagination does the maker intend the instrument to be
payable to the party before him. He contemplates dealings not with the impostor,
but with another, the alleged principal, and, therefore, title does not pass.
35
31. Smith Typewriter Co. v. Stidger, i8 Colo. App. 261, 71 Pac. 400 (1903); Rogers v.
Dutton, 182 Mass. 187, 65 N. E. 56 (1902) ; RESTAT.EMENT, CONTRAcTs (1932) § 475, com-
ment a.
32. Indianapolis Saddlery Co. v. Curry, 193 Ind. 346, 138 N. E. 337 (1923); Edmunds
v. Merchants Dispatch Transportation Co., 135 Mass. 283 (1883) ; Cohen v. Savoy Restau-
rant, i89 N. Y. Supp. 71 (Sup. Ct. 1921) ; Decan v. Shipper, 35 Pa. 239 (i86o) ; Gose v.
Brooks, 229 S. W. 979 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
33. Ryan v. Bank of Italy Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n, io6 Cal. App. 69o, 289 Pac. 863
(1930) ; Montgomery Garage Co. v. Manufacturer's Liab. Ins. Co., 94 N. J. L. 152, io9 Atl.
296 (1921) ; Land Title & Trust Co. v. Northwestern Nat. Bank, 211 Pa. 211, 6o Atl. 723
(1905) ; North Phila. Trust Co. v. Kensington Nat. Bank, 196 Atl. 14 (Pa. 1938) ; Defiance
Lumber Co. v. Bank of Calif., i8o Wash. 533, 41 P. (2d) 135 (1935); see Montgomery Ward
& Co. v. Central Co-operative Ass'n, 276 N. W. 731 (Minn. 1937); BRANNAN, NEGWTIABLE
INSTRUMENTs LAw (5th ed. 1932) 306. See also Notes (1930) 35 DIcK. L. RE v. go, (192o)
34 HARV. L. REV. 76.
34. Boatsman v. Stockmen's Nat. Bank, 56 Colo. 495, 138 Pac. 754 (1914) ; Uriola v.
Twin Falls Bank & Trust Co., 37 Idaho 332, 215 Pac. io8O (923) ; Emporia Nat. Bank v.
Shotwell, 35 Kan. 360, ii Pac. 141 (1886). Contra: Palm v. Watt, 7 Hun. 317 (N. Y.
1876); Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Silverman, 148 App. Div. 1, 132 N. Y. Supp. 1017 (1st
Dep't, i911), aff'd, 21o N. Y. 567, 104 N. E. 1134 (1914). See 5 WILLISTON, CONrRAcMS
§ 1517B.
35. Strang v. Westchester County Nat. Bank, 235 N. Y. 68, 138 N. E. 739 (1923), 23
COL. L. Rxv. 495, 7 MINN. L. REv. 582; United Cigar Stores v. American Raw Silk Co., 184
App. Div. 217, 171 N. Y. Supp. 48o (ist Dep't, 1918); Goodfellow v. First Nat. Bank, 71
Wash. 554, 129 Pac. 9o (1913).
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Until recently, with only a few exceptions now generally regarded as legal
anomalies, 6 the courts have consistently held that where the impostor in person
obtains a note made out to him in his assumed name, he gets title.17  However,
during the past two years, two courts have gone out of their way to hold that title
does not pass and that the loss occasioned by the fraud should fall on the bona
fide transferee from the impostor. In Keel v. Wynne,38 the defendant, a court
clerk, held money due one X under a court order. X's brother represented to
defendant that he was X, whereupon the defendant made out a check for the
amount due and handed it to the impostor. Later, in the presence of the plaintiff,
the impostor indorsed "X" on the back of the check and the plaintiff guaranteed
the signature. Subsequently becoming liable on his indorsement, the plaintiff
failed to recover his loss in a suit against the clerk. It would seem clear that the
defendant intended to make the check payable to the man before him, who was
the impostor, and, being the payee, the latter, by his indorsement, could pass title
to the instrument.
3 9
In Cohen v. Lincoln Savings Bank,4 0 the impostor, posing as assignor of a
certain condemnation award, induced the holder of a check to deliver it to him,
indorsed to the real assignor. The impostor, after indorsing it with the assignor's
name, transferred it to a bona fide purchaser for value. It was held 4' that the
loss should fall on the innocent transferee. The New York Court of Appeals
declared that even though the dealings were face to face, the intention of the
holder was not to transfer title to the party before him but to the individual he
assumed to be. Furthermore, the court remarked that the physical presence doc-
trine applies only where there have been prior dealings between the parties.
Inasmuch as this requirement is unwarranted from the standpoints of both
authority and reason, it is to be hoped that these decisions do not indicate a new
trend in the law.
Summary
.It is a reasonable rule of construction that where one deals in person with
an impostor, he intends to deal with the party before him and not with the person
whom the impostor purports to be. The same rule seems to prevail where the
dealings are by telephone. Where, however, the dealings are by correspondence,
it is generally held that the intention is to deal with the person whose name was
signed to the letter or if a fictitious name is employed, with the party signing the
letter inasmuch as he is presumed to have adopted the name for this transaction.
However, exceptions exist in the field of negotiable instruments where, in order
to foster ready negotiability, it is presumed that the intention of the maker is to
make the instrument payable to the signer of the letter and, therefore, title to the
instrument is held to pass. But where the impostor, either in person or by letter,
represents that he is acting as agent for another, it is universally held that no
title passes inasmuch as the intention could not have been to contract with the
impostor himself but rather with an alleged principal. Thus, it appears that until
recently, these questions were, for the most part, accepted law based on both
reason and convenience. It would be unfortunate, indeed, should the most recent
36. The minority consists only of Miners & Merchants Bank v. St. Louis Smelting &
Refining Co., 178 S. W. 211 (Mo. 1915) ; Tolman v. American National Bank, 22 R. I. 462,
48 At. 480 (19o) ; Rolling v. El Paso & S. W. Ry., 127 S. W. 302 (Tex. Civ. App. 19o) ;
Simpson v. Denver & R. G. R. R., 43 Utah 105, 134 Pac. 883 (913). See BRAN'TNAN, NE-
GOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW wNrr COMMiENTS AND CRITICISMS (I908) 128.
37. For helpful annotations, see Notes (1923) 22 A. L. IL 1228, (1928) 52 A. L. 1. 1326.
38. 21o N. C. 426, 187 S. E. 571 (1936).
39. See discussion of case in Note (936) 15 N. C. L. Ray. 186.
40. 275 N. Y. 399, o N. E. (2d) 457 (1937), 86 U. OF PA. L. REV. 209.
41. Hubbs, J., and Crane, C. J., dissenting.
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holdings lay a foundation for upsetting a field of law heretofore so satisfactorily
settled.
C. C. I., Jr.
Supersedure of State Laws by Federal Regulations Under the
Commerce Clause
The supremacy of Congressional power over interstate commerce, by virtue
of the commerce clause,1 never has been seriously questioned. 2 At the same time,
it is well recognized that the states, from the dawn of our national existence, have
exercised a substantial degree of control over such matters.3 The nature of this
dual control has long constituted a favorite topic for legal discussion.4 However,
the prevailing constitutional theory may be conveniently crystallized in the follow-
ing analysis: In matters of national concern (those requiring uniformity of
regulation), the power to regulate interstate commerce is vested exclusively in
Congress.5 However, through the exercise of its police power and in the absence
of conflict with the will of Congress, a state may enact general laws governing its
internal affairs which incidentally affect commerce of national import.6 Under
these circumstances, however, the absence of federal legislation permitting such
state control has been interpreted to be evidence of the intent of Congress to
preclude state action within the sphere.7 On the other hand, where the subject is
one of local concern, state regulation is permissible unless it conflicts with federal
laws governing the subject.8 Thus, in the latter situation, the silence of Congress
is held, although inconsistently, to mean that the operation of the state law shall
not be impaired. However, even in the absence of conflict, should the state statute
be found to have entered a field which Congress intended to occupy through some
affirmative act of legislation, the state rule will be rendered totally ineffective.9
Thus stated, the formula appears clear. However, in view of the flexibility of
many of the terms involved, its application in a given situation may become a
i. U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8.
2. Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 398-399 (1913); Southern Ry. v. Railroad
Comm., 236 U. S. 439, 446 (1913) ; Missouri Pac. R. R. v. Stroud, 267 U. S. 4o4, 4o8 (1925).
3. See RiBBLF, STATE AND NATIONAL POWER OvER CoMMERCE (1937) 182-201, 230.
4. GAVIT, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE (1932) §§ i-11; LEwis, FEDERAL POWER OVER Com-
mERCE (1892) §§ 7o-85; RIBBLE, op. cit. supra note 3; WILLIS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1936)
297; Cooke, The Pseudo-Doctrine of the Exclusiveness of the Power of Congress to Regu-
late Commerce (1911) 20 YALE L. J. 297; Needham, The Exclusive Power of Congress
Over Interstate Commerce (911) II COL. L. REV. 251.
5. Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U. S. 489 (1887) ; Sanitary Dist. of Chi-
cago v. United States, 266 U. S. 405 (1925).
6. In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545 (i891) ; Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry., 242
U. S. 311 (1917). These cases held, in effect, that where Congress had indicated, by express
legislation, that the exercise of state power was permissible, the state enactment was effective
even though the court recognized the national character of the commerce affected. For an
excellent analysis of the foregoing decisions, see Bikl, The Silence of Congress (1927) 41
HARv. L. REv. 2oo.
7. Bowman v. Chicago & N. Ry., 125 U. S. 465 (1888) ; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. I00
(189o).
8. Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352 (1913) ; Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service
Comm., 252 U. S. 23 (1920). There is occasional language, particularly in the earlier cases,
to the effect that such control results from the exercise of the state police power which "inci-
dentally affects" interstate commerce of a local nature. However, the actual holdings leave
but little doubt that the power of the states to regulate commerce of this character has long
been permitted by the Supreme Court.
9. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Washington, 222 U. S. 37o (1912), :o MIcH. L. REv. 555;
Oregon-Washington R. R. & Nay. Co. v. Washington, 27o U. S. 87 (1926), 74 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 852.
NOTES
source of considerable uncertainty. Thus, the distinction between laws which
merely affect and those which regulate interstate commerce of a national character,
the boundaries between matters of local and those of national concern, the discov-
ery of the Congressional intent to occupy a given field and the determination of
the field occupied, may all eventually resolve themselves into pure questions of
judicial opinion.' 0 The problems involved in determining what constitutes a valid
exercise of state authority during the inaction of Congress are not, however,
within the scope of the present discussion." Having established the validity of
such state control, varied difficulties may arise when Congress breaks its silence.
"Occupying the Field"-In General
It has already been indicated that a state law conflicting with a rule estab-
lished by Congress will be inoperative. Moreover, where both enactments coin-
cide in their field of operation, the state rule, although consistent with the federal
enactment, nevertheless will be superseded since, in view of the principle of
federal supremacy, there can be no such divided authority.12 In addition, since
the validity of state legislation affecting interstate commerce in its local aspects is
predicated upon the will of Congress, should the latter manifest a desire to assume
exclusive control over the "field" in question, all state laws within the field
occupied must fall, irrespective of the existence of federal regulations governing
the same matter.' The application of the latter doctrine, however, often will
present a source of difficulty in which may center marked divergencies of opinion.
The discovery of the Congressional will to occupy a given field and the ascertain-
ment of its exact limits is, fundamentally, a pure question of statutory construction
and, as such, may offer broad opportunities for judicial interpretation and impli-
cation. It is not surprising, therefore, to find inconsistent holdings flowing from
applications of the same doctrine. Thus, the Federal Hours of Service Act,"
although not operative until a year after its passage, nevertheless was held to have
occupied the field immediately with resultant supersedure of state rules during
the interim.35 This was so despite the fact that no federal regulations were yet in
existence with which a state law could coincide or conflict. From a consideration
of the foregoing decision, it would not be illogical to suppose that whenever Con-
gress enacts a law relating to a given field, the whole field is immediately occupied
precluding state activity within the same realm. But nothing could be more mis-
leading. Thus, the provisions of the Federal Food and Drug Act prohibiting a
misstatement of the contents of food products 16 were declared insufficient to
1o. RIBBLEj, op. cit. supra note 3, 183, 212-214; Powell, Current Conflict Betweent the
Commerce Clause and State Police Power, 1922-1927 (1928) 12 MiNN. L. REv. 6o7, 6o8.
ii. See Powell, supra note 10, 321, 325, 470.
12. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Hardwick Farmers Elevator Co., 226 U. S. 426
(.913); Erie R. R. v. New York, 233 U. S. 671 (914); Southern Ry. v. Railroad Comm.,
236 U. S. 439 (19,5).
13. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Washington, 222 U. S. 370 (1912), 10 MIcH. L. REv. 555;
Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491 (1913), 26 HARv. L. RE.. 456; Oregon-
Washington R. R. & Nay. Co. v. Washington, 270 U. S. 87 (1926), 74 U. OF PA. L. REv.
852; see Southern Ry. v. Reid, 222 U. S. 424, 435 (1912); RIBBLE, op. Cit. supra note 3, c.
io. In a number of recent treatises, the term "conflict implied-in-law" has been used to de-
scribe the nature of the instant theory. GAvIT, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE (1932) § 121 ; WIL-
Lis, CoxsnTrrUTioNA. LAW (1936) 299. Such terminology, however, is misleading inasmuch
as the theory of supersedure in the specific instance is not conflict between federal and state
laws but the intent of Congress to assume exclusive control over the subject to the exclusion
of state power.
14. 34 STAT. 1416 (o907), 45 U. S. C. A. § 62 (1928).
IS. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Washington, 222,U. S. 370 (1912), 10 MICH. L. REV. 555.
16. 34 STAT. 768 (1906), 21 U. S. C. A. §2 (1927).
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invalidate state laws requiring a complete disclosure of the same.' 7 In the latter
case, the court found two distinct fields of legislation giving rise to independent
spheres of operation. The existence of federal and state enactments with respect
to the same subject was not seriously considered. It is evident, therefore, that
more fundamental considerations than fine legal distinctions must exist. In the
latter case, the court apparently sympathized with the purpose of the state enact-
ment and the flexibility of the judicial dogma afforded a convenient means of
upholding its validity. An explanation of the former decision will probably be
found to lie in the prevailing economic philosophy of the court. The divergent
theories employed in determining the intent of Congress to occupy a given field
are also worthy of notice inasmuch as either have been consistently used according
to the result obtained. Where occupation was found to have occurred, the fact
that Congress had enacted legislation relating to the subject became the focal
point of judicial construction.3 Where no occupation was discovered, the court
declared that the intent of Congress to invalidate noncoincident state legislation
was not to be inferred in the absence of actual conflict.' 9 It is evident that, in the
absence of an expressed Congressional intent to the contrary, a strict application
of the latter rule of construction would entirely abrogate the theory of supersedure
without coincidence or conflict. An attempt to reconcile all the various holdings
would accomplish no worthy purpose. The apparent state of confusion already
has been a source of legal comment,20 but the problem of when supersedure will
be found to occur, in the absence of conflicting state legislation, has been generally
placed aside. As is discernible from the foregoing discussion, a definite formula,
universally applicable, is impossible of concoction. However, through the process
of classification and comparison, certain rules and tendencies in judicial construc-
tion will be discovered.
"Occupying the Field"-Rules and Tendencies of Judicial Interpretation
x. Invalid Federal Enactment: Where a Congressional enactment, regulating
some phase of interstate commerce, is later found to be void because contra-
vening some constitutional limitation, how indicative is this of the intent of Con-
gress? Such a question arose in connection with the first Federal Employers'
Liability Act 21 which had been invalidated as exceeding the powers of Congress
under the commerce clause.2 2 It was held that all state laws on the subject were
effective since the Federal Enactment was "as inoperative as if it had never been
passed, for an unconstitutional act is not a law and can neither confer a right or
immunity nor operate to supersede any existing valid law." 23 The Congressional
act must have been passed with the assumption that it would be effective. In
view of the serious social effects that might have resulted, it clearly would have
been unreasonable to infer a legislative intent to nullify existing state control
even should the Federal Enactment be rendered inoperative. Apparently, this
constitutes the only decision on the point and the adjudication reached evidently
is desirable.
2. Effect of Expiration of Federal Statute: Similar problems may arise when
the effective period of a federal law has expired or when the Congressional enact-
ment is repealed. Assuming that the state law which had been superseded has
17. Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501 (1912).
18. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Washington, 222 U. S. 370, 378 (1912).
ig. Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501, 533 (1912).
2o. Grant, The Scope and Nature of Concurrent Power (1934) 34 COL. L. REv. 995,
1038.
21. 34 STAT. 232 (1906).
22. Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463 (19o8).
23. Chicago, I. & L. Ry. v. Hackett, 228 U. S. 559, 566 (1913).
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never been repealed, does it again govern the subject within its jurisdiction? It
has been held that, with the removal of federal restrictions, it becomes operative
again without the necessity of a reenactment.2 4  The revival of a state law, after
a long period of supersedure, conceivably may result in the imposition of a law
no longer suited to the needs of the social group. On the other hand, if the federal
enactment has only been effective for a short period, it may be manifestly unwise
to deny the further operation of state laws. Thus, the desirability of the rule will
depend on the individual circumstances involved.
3. Power of Investigation Granted Administrative Tribunal: Congress may
authorize an administrative body to investigate and report upon the need for
federal regulation of a given field. Several lower court decisions, involving such
a state of facts, have been handed down recently in connection with certain of the
provisions of the Federal Motor Carriers Act.2 > As might have been expected, the
courts were unanimous in finding no supersedure.2 8  To have construed such an
authorization as indicative of the Congressional will to assume control over the
field of legislation evidently would have constituted a strained legalism. In any
event, the Supreme Court has already held that an intent to supersede existing
state laws will not be inferred from the grant of a mere power of investigation.
2
7
4. Administrative Body or Official Vested With Authority over Subject but,
as Yet, No Regulations Promulgated: Where Congress has vested an adminis-
trative tribunal or official with authority to prescribe regulations over a given
subject, the question has arisen as to whether this alone constitutes an occupation
of the field. Inconsistent rulings have resulted giving rise to a number of dis-
senting opinions. On the one hand, it was held that the amended Locomotive
Boiler Inspection Act,2 vesting the Interstate Commerce Commission with full
control over the general subject indicated, superseded state legislation requring
certain necessary locomotive equipment and this was so despite the fact that the
Commission had failed to take any action with regard to the precise matter.
2 9 So,
also, a federal statute vesting the Secretary of Agriculture with authority to make
regulations with respect to certain quarantines was declared to have invalidated
existing state legislation on the subject although no administrative regulations
had been promulgated. 0 A dissent was interposed in which the validity of such
an implication was denied 8 and, shortly afterwards, a joint Congressional reso-
lution was passed indicating a desire that state laws should operate in the in-
terim.32 On the other hand, it has been held that the mere grant to the Interstate
Commerce Commission of a large measure of control over interstate commerce
24. Missouri Pac. R. R. v. Boone, 270 U. S. 466 (1926).
25. 49 STAT. 566 (935), 49 U. S. C. A. § 325 (Supp. 1937).
26. L. & L. Freight Lines v. Railroad Comm., 17 F. Supp. 13 (S. D. Fla. 1936) ; Barn-
well Bros. v. South Carolina State Highway Dep't, 1[7 F. Supp. 803 (E. D. S. C. 1937);
Werner Transp. Co. v. Hughes, ig F. Supp. 425 (N. D. Ill. 1937).
27. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Georgia, 234 U. S. 280 (1914).
28. 43 STAT. 659 (1924), 45 U. S. C. A. §§23 et seq. (1928).
29. Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 272 U. S. 6o5 (1926) ; cf. Western Union Tel.
Co. v. Boegi, 251 U. S. 315 (1920).
30. Oregon-Washington R. R. & Nav. Co. v. Washington, 27o U. S. 87 (1926), 74 U. o
PA. L. REv. 852.
31. Justices McReynolds and Sutherland, dissenting, declared that it would be "a serious
thing to paralyze the efforts of a state to protect her people against impending calamity and
leave them to the slow charity of a far-off and perhaps supine federal bureau." Id. at io3.
32. 44 STAT. 250 (1926), 7 U. S. C. A. § 16i (Supp. 1937). For a similar situation,
compare Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 13 How. 5,8 (U. S. i85i) with
id., 18 How. 421 (U. S. I855).
33. Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Larabee Flour Mills Co., 211 U. S. 612 (1909).
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would not affect state control in the absence of administrative action.8  Another
dissent was interposed in which it was declared that inasmuch as the Commission
was authorized to deal with the subject, state legislation should have been pre-
cluded.8 In a more recent decision, it was held that although the Commission
had authority over depreciation rates of telephone companies, state laws were still
applicable where no final regulations had been made.85 Even where administra-
tive orders were made but were uncertain in their field of operation, it has been
held that supersedure had not resulted.8 6 From the foregoing review, it seems
difficult to extract a governing principle. The ultimate decision would thus
appear to depend upon the individual case and the judicial end desired. Certainly,
it is desirable that such a Congressional enactment should be ineffective to super-
sede state laws as long as no administrative action has been taken. A contrary
adjudication can only leave the field devoid of regulation with probable harmful
social consequences.
5. Postponed Date of Effectiveness: Other difficulties may arise when the
effective date of a federal statute is postponed. In a case involving the Federal
Hours of Service Act, to which reference has already been made,87 it was held
that state laws were superseded during the interval. In that case, decided in 1911,
it was said that the purpose of the postponement was "to enable necessary adjust-
ments to be made by the railroads to meet new conditions created by the
act .. . ." I's No subsequent decision has been found. As indicated previously,
the theory employed in determining the intent of Congress centered about the
fact that federal legislation had been enacted with respect to the subject. 9 Thus,
in view of the peculiar facts involved and the present trend to require coincidence
or inconsistency before supersedure will be declared,40 it appears doubtful whether,
in the ordinary case, the same rule would be enunciated today.
6. Subject Partially Covered by Sporadic Enactments: Only two cases have
been found involving situations in which a given subject has received sporadic
attention in the form of occasional Congressional enactments. However, no
supersedure was found in either case, the court being reluctant to invalidate the
state law in the absence of conflict or coincidence. In both instances, the state
enactment had filled a real need that Congress had failed to consider. One case
involved a state statute requiring locomotive headlights of a certain intensity;
federal enactments relating to almost every other type of locomotive equipment
were in existence.41 Another case, decided during the present term of the Su-
preme Court, held that state legislation governing the inspection of hulls and
machinery of motor driven tug boats was not abrogated by the Federal Motor Boat
Regulations Act 42 and various other federal enactments which, although exten-
sively regulating vessel inspection, lacked provisions on the specific matter.48 In
both cases the court declared that Congress had only occupied a limited field.
7. Extensive Federal Enactment-State Law Either Filling Gap or Provid-
ing Additional Rules: The greatest number of decisions involving the doctrine of
34. Id. at 626.
35. Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 282 U. S. 133 (1930).
36. Illinois Cent. R. R. v. State Public Utilities Comm., 245 U. S. 493 (1918).
37. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Washington, 222 U. S. 370 (1912), supra note 15.
38. Id. at 379.
39. Id. at 378.
40. See infra note go.
41. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Georgia, 234 U. S. 280 (1914).
42. 36 STAT. 462 (I910), 46 U. S. C. A. §§ 511-520 (1928).
43. Kelly v. Washington ex rel. Foss Co., 302 U. S. I (1937), 51 HAav. L. REv. 357.
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supersedure has arisen in connection with cases in which Congress has enacted
broad or extensive legislation with regard to a given subject but had failed to
include provisions on a given point. The validity of state legislation that either
filled the gap or provided additional rules was thus subject to attack. With
respect to the field occupied, the silence of Congress on the specific point is thus
capable of two opposing inferences: (i) no regulation was desired at all, or (2)
federal regulation was not desired inasmuch as it was the intent of Congress that
the particular matter should remain under state control. In the usual case, the
discovery of the intent of Congress merely constitutes the creation of a fiction as
the omission probably has been the result of inadvertence. Although no attempt
will be made to reconcile all the decisions, an analysis of actual results obtained
will illustrate distinct tendencies in judicial interpretation, according to the nature
of the subject involved.
(a) State Quarantines: With the exception of a single case, to which refer-
ence has already been made," the Supreme Court has consistently demonstrated
its diligence in upholding state quarantine legislation. Thus, a Congressional
enactment declaring it an offense for one knowingly to transport diseased livestock
from one state to another was held not to invalidate state requirements of a cer-
tificate of health irrespective of the shipper's actual knowledge of the condition of
the cattle.45 Again, a later federal statute requiring the obtaining of a similar
certificate prior to interstate transportation of cattle was held not to supersede
state legislation requiring like certificates to be secured from state 46 or federal 4 7
officials.
(b) Foods and Drugs: A similar tendency may be discovered with respect
to state food and drug laws. Thus, the provisions of the Federal Food and Drugs
Act prohibiting interstate commerce in adulterated or misbranded articles 48 were
held insufficient to supersede state laws requiring disclosure of the contents 49
and the use of specified labels,50 or to invalidate a state prohibition against the
shipment of fruit either immature or unfit for consumption.' Again, state restric-
tions on the prescription of narcotic drugs by physicians within the course of their
professional practice were held not to have been superseded by the Harrison Anti-
Narcotic Drug Act 52 which, although providing broad regulations, failed to
impose similar limitations."
(c) Migratory Game: With regard to state efforts at game conservation, the
Supreme Court has displayed an equally sympathetic attitude. Thus, the Federal
Migratory Bird Act declaring all such game to be within federal protection and
44. Oregon-Washington R. R. & Nav. Co. v. Washington, 270 U. S. 87 (1926), supra
note 30.
45. Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137 (1902) ; cf. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Haber, 169
U. S. 613 (1898).
46. Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U. S. 346 (1933).
47. Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U. S. 251 (19o8). In view of the coincidence of regulations
in the instant case, it seems that supersedure should have resulted. However, the case affords
an excellent illustration of the sympathetic attitude of the court toward the type of state legis-
lation involved.
48. 34 STAT. 768 (i906), 21 U. S. C. A. §2 (1927).
49. Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 5o (912).
50. Armour & Co. v. North Dakota, 24o U. S. 510 (1916); Corn Products Refining Co.
v. Eddy, 249 U. S. 427 (1919).
5L Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U. S. 52 (1915).
52. 38 STAT. 785 (1914), 26 U. S. C. A. § io43 (b) (1935).
53. Minnesota ex rel. Whipple v. Martinson, 256 U. S. 41 (1921).
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providing regulations with regard to closed seasons and related matters,54 was
held not to have invalidated state prohibitions against the shipment of wild
ducks.5 5
(d) Warehouse and Exchange Regulations: With regard to state laws
relating to warehouses and exchanges, similar tendencies may be noted. Thus, in
the absence of conflict or coincidence, the comprehensive Federal Grain Standards
Act 56 was declared not to have superseded state legislation prescribing the quali-
fications of grain weighers.57 Likewise, the broad Federal Tobacco Inspection
Act 58 was held not to invalidate state requirements with respect to the sale of
leaf tobacco.55 Again, a state provision requiring specified commission merchants
to procure licenses, keep certain records and post bonds was not invalidated by
the Federal Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act 60 which, in regulating the
same subject, failed to impose the necessity of a bond.6' Also, the Federal Grain
Futures Act 6 2 prescribing regulations for trading in futures was held not to have
voided a state bucket shop law which declared certain practices, not prohibited by
the Federal Act, to be illegal.6"
(e) Port Pilotage: Similarly, state port pilotage provisions have been upheld
in the face of broad federal enactments by distinguishing between port pilots and
voyage pilots entering port, the federal enactment being construed to be applicable
only in the latter situation.64 In addition, a differentiation has been made between
enrolled and registered vessels, the court holding that where the latter are ex-
pressly exempt from the application of the federal provisions, the operation of
state control is not intended to be precluded.
65
(f) Railroad Regulation: With the exception of isolated instances, the tend-
ency to nullify state control over railroads has been marked. It is suspected that
the source of this judicial paternalism probably lies in an admixture of the historic
policy of fostering railroad development, the feeling that the subject was one
peculiarly requiring federal regulation and, possibly, in the earlier careers of
many of the Supreme Court justices. Thus, the second Federal Employers' Lia-
bility Act imposing civil liability for injuries due to the negligence of the carrier
and also providing a death statute in connection therewith,6 6 was held to have
occupied the field to the exclusion of state laws making proof of injury by a loco-
motive prima facie evidence of negligence 67 or declaring it to be negligence per se
54. 37 STAT. 847 (1913). This Act was later superseded by another Federal Enactment
on the same subject. 40 STAT. 755 (1918), 16 U. S. C. A. § 705 (1926). The validity of the
former Act, which was based on the commerce power, was never passed upon by an appel-
late court but § 4 of the present Act would appear to be a permissible regulation of interstate
commerce.
55. Carey v. South Dakota, 250 U. S. 118 (1919).
56. 39 STAT. 482, 484 (1916), 7 U. S. C. A. §§ 74, 79 (1927).
57. Merchants Exchange of St. Louis v. Missouri ex rel. Barker, 248 U. S. 365 (1919).
58. 49 STAT. 731 (935), 7 U. S. C. A. § 5 1 et seq. (Supp. 1936).
59. Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U. S. 441 (937).
6o. 46 STAT. 531 (930), 7 U. S. C. A. §§ 499a et seq. (Supp. 1936).
61. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Illinois, 298 U. S. 155 (1936). Although the
court pointed out that the Federal Act specifically exempted consistent state laws, the case
was not decided on this ground.
62. 42 STAT. 998 (1922), 7 U. S. C. A. §§ i et seq. (1927).
63. Dickson v. Ulhmann Grain Co., 288 U. S. 188 (933).
64. Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. 450 (U. S. 1864).
65. Anderson v. Pacific Coast Steamship Co., 225 U. S. 187 (1912).
66. 35 STAT. 65 (I908), 45 U. S. C. A. § 5, (1928).
67. New Orleans & N. R. R. v. Harris, 247 U. S. 367 (1918).
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to employ certain minors about freight cars 6s and to preclude recovery under a
state survival law despite the absence of such a provision in the federal enact-
ment. 9 However, a state statute permitting an attorney's lien upon the cause of
action was upheld as not touching upon the carrier's liability to its employees.
70
The Carmack Amendment to the Hepburn Act forbidding carriers to exempt
themselves from liability by contract, rule or stipulation 
71 was held to supersede
state laws voiding provisions limiting a carrier's liability to the 
agreed value.7 2
In declaring such a stipulation not to constitute a limitation on liability for negli-
gence, the court found that although the Federal Act was silent on the point, its
extensive nature excluded state supervision. Provisions in shipping contracts as
to time limitations on bringing suit, which had been forbidden by state statute,
were declared valid although the Carmack Amendment again was silent on the
point.73 A stipulation in a bill of lading, prohibited by state law, exempting the
carrier from liability for loss due to fire was declared enforceable since the court
found that Congress had assumed control over the general field of liability and
such a stipulation had not been forbidden.
74 A state law invalidating stipulations
in a free pass by which the user assumed all the risks of accident was held to be
superseded by the Hepburn Act which, although regulating the giving of inter-
state passes, was silent on the rights of the parties in connection with the use
thereof. 75 More recent cases, however, would indicate a trend away from this
judicial paternalism in cases where the binding force of precedent has not yet
become too strongly entrenched.
7 6 Thus, it has been held that the Federal Safety
Appliance Acts regulating carrier equipment and providing penalties for viola-
tions thereof,77 did not preclude recovery under a state workmen's compensation
act.78 It is believed that, in the vast majority of cases, such a trend should pro-
vide for socially more desirable results.
Conclusion
From the foregoing analysis, it is apparent that the doctrine of supersedure,
itself a product of judicial construction, has provided the high court with 
a con-
venient means of obtaining desired ends. On the whole, this judicial prerogative
appears to have been well exercised. Former trends already have been reviewed.
With the exception of a few anomalous decisions 79 and those relating to railroad
68. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Stapleton, 279 U. S. 587 (1929).
69. Michigan Cent. Ry. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59 (1913).
70. Dickinson v. Stiles, 246 U. S. 631 (19i8) ; cf. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. 
v. Harris, 234
U. S. 412 (914), io MIcH. L. REv. 641.
71. 34 STAT. 584 (i9o6), 49 U. S. C. A. § i (1-9) (1929).
72. Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491 (913), 26 H 
A'V. L. REv. 456; Chi-
cago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Miller, 226 U. S. 513 (913) ; Chicago, R. I. & P. 
. R. v. Cramer, 232
U. S. 490 (914) ; cf. Boston & Maine R. R. v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97 (1914).
73- Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Harriman, 227 U. S. 657 (913); 
cf. St. Louis, I. M. & S.
Ry. v. Starbird, 243 U. S. 592 (917).
74. Missouri Pac. R. P. v. Porter, 273 U. S. 341 (1927), 25 MIcHa. L. REv. 9o2.
75. Kansas City S. Ry. v. Van Zant, 260 U. S. 459 (i923). 
But cf. Southern Pac. Co.
v. Schyler, 227 U. S. 6oi (1913).
76. Western & A. .. .. v. Georgia Public Service Comm., 267 U. S. 493 (1925); 
Mis-
souri-Kansas-Texas P. R. v. Mars, 278 U. S. 258 (1929) ; Missouri Pac. R. R. v. Norwood,
283 U. S. 249 (ig3I) ; Atchison, T. & St. F. Ry. v. Railroad Comm., 283 U. S. 380 (93).
77. 27 STAT. 531 (1893), 45 U. S. C. A. §2 (1928) ; 32 STAT. 943 (1903), 45 U. 
S. C.
A. §8 (1928).
78. Gilvary v. Cuyahoga Valley Ry., 292 U. S. 57 (i934).
79. E. g., Oregon-Washington R. R. & Nay. Co. v. Washington, 270 U. S. 87 (1926),
supra note 3o. It sliould be noted that the holdings in Northern Pac. Ry. v. 
Washington, 222
U. S. 370 (1912), supra notes 15, 37-39, and Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. 
R., 272 U. S.
6o5 (1926), supra note 29, in which supersedure was declared to exist irrespective 
of con-
flict or coincidence, really constitute but another aspect of past judicial paternalism 
with re-
spect to railroad regulation.
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regulation, it is evident that, in the absence of express provisions to the contrary,
actual conflict or coincidence has provided the real test as to the supersedure of
the state rule. Thus, the extensive theories propounded in relation to Congres-
sional "occupation of the field" despite the absence of conflict or coincidence,
appear to find but limited support in the actual holdings. Although a few recent
cases have indicated a trend toward the total abandonment of the doctrine, 0 in
view of the convenience which the formula may provide on a difficult occasion,
such a conclusion would appear to be premature. The result, however, would be
of the utmost value in eliminating a virulent source of uncertainty in the law.
A. C.
8o. The most recent cases involving the doctrine stress the necessity for conflict or
coincidence before the intent of Congress to supersede existing state laws will be implied.
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Illinois, 298 UI. S. i55 (1936) ; Townsend v. Yeomans,
301 U. S. 44, (1937) ; Kelly v. Washington ex rel. Foss Co., 302 U. S. I (937).
